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Formalizing informal homes, a bad idea: The Credibility Thesis applied to China’s 
“extra-legal” housing 
 
Abstract 
Discussions about informal housing in developing, emerging economies often revolve around 
the need for prohibition, privatization and formalization. Private title is seen as a guarantee 
against indiscriminate expropriation leading to tenure security, better access to utilities and 
mortgage, and higher investments. However, the argument that formalization and 
privatization out of necessity lead to better rights of otherwise “victimized slum-dwellers” can 
be questioned. In addition, prohibition of informal housing can marginalize socially weaker 
groups, while drawing on critical resources for enforcement. We argue that to avoid 
externalities, one first needs to probe into the perceived function of existing property rights 
before considering institutional form, irrespective whether formal or informal. China’s extra-
legal housing – or “Small Property Rights’ Housing” (SPRH) – is a case-in-point. Extra-legal 
housing is estimated to account for one-third of the Chinese urban housing stock. In light of 
this scale, we maintain that extra-legal housing performs a vital function in providing social 
security, i.e. affordable housing for low(er) income groups. The argument is supported 
through a survey amongst 300 respondents in 7 medium and large-sized cities. The survey 
finds that – despite alleged tenure insecurity – SPRH rallies a high level of perceived 
credibility along three dimensions: economic, social and psychological. Our findings indicate 
that urban planning and housing policy should consider institutional differences in line with 
existing functions. Put differently, whereas formalization, privatization or prohibition could 
be contemplated when credibility for informal housing is low, maintaining status-quo might 
be more sensible when that credibility is perceived to be high. 
 
Key words  
Social welfare and security; slums and squatter settlements; Chinese urban village; 
development and housing policy; affordable housing; low-cost and social housing 
 
1. Introduction  
 
The Land Administration Law of China stipulates that if any entity or individual needs to use 
land for construction, they must apply for the use of urban, state-owned land. In recent years, 
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a large amount of housing has been built on rural collectively owned land, and sold to 
individuals whose hukou (household registration) is not registered in the corresponding 
collective.1 Compared to formal commercial housing built on urban, state-owned land with a 
legal title issued by the county government or higher authority, such housing does not have 
legal titling. It is why in Chinese it is popularly referred to as “Small Property Rights 
Housing” (xiaochanquan fang) as opposed to “Large Property Rights Housing” (dachanquan 
fang) with full ownership. However, rather than labeling it as “illegal” or “informal” housing, 
it could be more aptly described as “extra-legal” rural-urban housing because of a dual reason: 
i) it is formally forbidden, yet, informally condoned and thus operates with silent statutory 
approval outside of the law;2 ii) it is sold at the rural and urban real estate market, more 
specifically the rural-urban fringe. 
According to unofficial data, total housing in urban China amounts to 18.6 billion m², of 
which 6.6 billion m² is Small Property Rights Housing (hereafter: SPRH) (Liu, 2009). 
Otherwise stated, over one third of the total housing in urban China (accounting for 
approximately 70 million housing units) is considered informal or extra-legal (Li, 2014). 
SPRH is believed to have emerged earliest in Guangdong Province in the early 1990s because 
of migrant workers’ increasing demands for affordable housing in receiving cities (Huang, 
2011). Nowadays, such housing is widespread across China and an increasing number of 
citizens purchase and live in it despite lack of legal titling. The southern metropolis of 
Shenzhen is regarded as the city with the highest ratio of extra-legal housing, accounting for 
49% of total municipal housing in 2010 (Gao, 2012).  While the phenomenon of SPRH has 
made national headlines in China, it has only recently begun to draw attention from the 
international academic community (Shen and Tu, 2014). 
By contrast, extensive research has been conducted on China’s informal settlements – of 
which SPRH are a part. In addition, the literature on these informal settlements, called “urban 
villages” (chengzhongcun), focuses on rental markets, the experiences of renters, and the 
positive impact of urban villages on migrants (Ma and Xiang, 1998; Tian, 2008; Wang et al, 
2009; He et al, 2010; Liu et al, 2010; Li and Wu, 2013; Wu et al, 2013; Huang and Tao, 2014). 
Over the years, however, a substantive number of people has purchased informal housing, 
instead of renting it. What is thus by and large missing from the literature is an analysis at the 
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 For more information on the origins of the hukou system, see (Cheng and Selden, 1994). 
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 As also argued by Liu et al. (2012), who assert that the Chinese government has tolerated and implicitly 
accepted informal housing development. 
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micro-level, seen from the perspectives of the buyers and home-owners, and focusing on 
informal housing rather than the settlement; hence the current writing. 
There are widely diverging opinions and suggested approaches for the regulation of extra-
legal housing in China. For instance, Paik and Lee (2012) argue that SPRH provides 
opportunities for collective action by local officials, entrepreneurs, farmers and citizens. Liu 
et al. (2012) point out that by building, selling or renting extra-legal housing, local villagers 
are able to profit from the “surplus value” created during urbanization. A review of relevant 
literature reveals that the legal perspective is of significant interest among Chinese scholars 
(Cheng, 2012). Due to the lack of formal rights, SPRH is deemed illegal by some scholars, 
who simultaneously assert that its development should be contained and cracked down upon 
(Zhao, 2008; Hua, 2014). Conversely, others argue that the prevalence of extra-legal housing 
challenges the state’s monopoly on land development rights, and indicate that existing 
property laws and policies have become an anachronism in a context of rapid urbanization 
(Zhou, 2007; Cai, 2013). Informal housing is also regarded as a form of grassroots’ 
spontaneous urbanization promoted by local village communities (Liu, 2014, p.127).3 The 
wide variety of opinions and approaches is, in fact, the reflection of China’s huge regional 
differences and varied building environments. It is why some advocate differential treatment 
based on local experimentation (Yang, 2013; Tao and Wang, 2014). 
The vexing question that surfaces is what indicators can be used to guide such differential 
treatment according to regional context and planned over time. We maintain that the answer 
to this question might perhaps lie in discarding a fixation on institutional Form in lieu of 
Function. In different wording, the choice for certain institutional forms – i.e. private/public, 
formal/informal, legal/illegal property – should be made contingent on actors’ perceived 
function that institutions already fulfill at a given time and place. Form follows from Function, 
as what institutions do determines their shape, regardless whether that lies in catering for 
commercial transfer, speculation, rent-seeking, cultural cohesion, or welfare and insurance. 
This article aims to demonstrate how function could be better assessed via actors’ aggregate 
perceptions of the credibility of institutions. Institutions are here defined as a set of 
endogenously evolved rules. Seen from this perspective, formal law or private title can be 
regarded as an institution, inasmuch as customary land tenure or extra-legal housing can be 
seen as such. 
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 More information about urban social movements around housing in China is also provided in (Zhu and Ho, 
2008).  
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Apart from the introduction and conclusion, the paper is divided into three separate sections. 
In the following section, we describe the theoretical underpinnings of our analysis, in terms of 
its main premises, concepts and underlying assumptions. In the second section an overview of 
the origins, magnitude and development of SPRH in China is given. The third section 
introduces the research methods, the survey sample, and presents the research findings 
divided along social actors’ perceptions of economic, social and psychological credibility. 
 
2. From Form to Function: The importance of being extra-legal 
 
Worldwide, it is estimated that more than one billion people live in informal settlements, a 
number expected to grow to 1.4 billion by 2020 (UN-Habitat, 2003). The importance of 
formal property rights for development has been a source of ongoing debate among housing 
researchers (e.g. Kiddle, 2010; Mukhija, 2012). According to figures of UN Habitat, globally 
between 30% and 50% of residents in urban areas allegedly lack legal security of tenure (2006, 
p. xi). According to neo-liberal, neo-classical postulates of development, private and formal 
property rights are vital for facilitating sustained economic growth. It is maintained that 
property rights that fail to respond to shifting economic opportunities will change into more 
efficient, institutional arrangements due to market forces. In this light, insecure and informal 
tenure are deemed at odds with modern, urbanized societies that thrive on legally described, 
thus titled, assets (e.g. Ellickson, 2012; Miceli, 2000). These scholarly principles go back to 
members of the so-called “Chicago school of economics” (e.g. Coase, 1960; Alchian and 
Demsetz, 1973) which advocated private, formal and secure property as the most efficient 
institutional arrangement. 
It is not being insinuated that a single body of literature exists that represents the “neo-liberal” 
or “neo-classical” theory that is consistent in its entirety. Instead, their premises comprise 
diverse inconsistencies and constituent elements that may concur or be contradictory in 
nature. 4  However, it is asserted that certain neo-liberal, neo-classical postulates or 
assumptions exist around which scholarly debate and empirical validation occur (Ho, 2013). 
These wield significant ascendancy over developmental policy and intervention. These neo-
liberal postulates include: i) property rights affect the economy (in a directly measurable, 
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 See (Lawson, 2013) for more information on the neo-classical school. 
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causal relationship); ii) property rights can be designed intentionally and exogenously (and be 
subsequently enforced); and lastly, iii) secure, private, and formal tenure (as institutional 
structures) are imperative for stable development. 
In contrast, the alleged relation between institutional form (formal, secure, and private) versus 
institutional performance (i.e. economic growth) has proven difficult to validate empirically. 
Research in widely diverging contexts did not find straightforward relationships between form 
and performance (cf. Ho and Spoor, 2006; Sjaastad and Cousins, 2009). A variety of case-
studies on land and housing (i.e. homestead) ranging from the United States (Ward et al., 
2011), Mexico (Monkkonen, 2012), Colombia (Gonzales, 2009) and Peru (King, 2003), 
ascertained no relation between formal title and economic performance (irrespective whether 
that was expressed in terms of home improvement, access to mortgage, property value, or 
poverty reduction). Even more, based on empirical data in Vietnam and China, Kim (2004) 
and Ho (2015) found that its housing market emerged despite a lack of legal title. Studies on 
Peru (Calderon, 2004) and Mexico (Varley, 1987) found that as long as dwellers perceive 
housing as secure, they will improve and invest in it, even when lacking title. Similarly, 
Lanjouw and Levy (2002) showed that granting legal title in Ecuador did not increase 
transaction value as dwellers of informal property unlikely sell their main abode. 
When reviewing these  studies, a confounding enigma surfaces. If informal property rights are 
economically inefficient and “perverse”, why do they persist? The “Credibility Thesis”  (Ho, 
2014) might have several critical contributions to make here. For one, it maintains that when 
property rights apparently “persist” over time they are not inefficient, yet, likely perform an 
endogenously, evolved function within society or a community of users, otherwise they would 
have changed or gone extinct (compare with e.g. Cheung, 1968; Caballero, 1983). Moreover, 
the thesis posits that what is misperceived as “persistence” or “stagnation” of inefficient, 
informal institutions is, in fact, a matter of minimal, yet, continuous functional adaptation 
over time (Thelen, 2002: 101). The answer to understanding the existence of certain 
institutional arrangements thus lies in abandoning focus on form, as it clouds analysis of what 
institutions mean and do in a certain context. Put differently: 
 
“[W]hat ultimately determines the performance of institutions is not their form in 
terms of formality, privatization, or security, but their spatially and temporally defined 
function” (Ho, 2014: 13). 
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That function can be expressed and measured by its institutional credibility, that is, the 
perceived social support at a given time and space. In so doing, the Credibility Thesis shifts 
institutional analysis from form to function (see Dixon, 2012; Chang, 2008: 19; Aron, 2000: 
128). Examining institutional credibility a priori requests the study of what institutions do in 
their time and space-specific environment prior to form-oriented labels such as “inefficient,” 
“second-best,” or “perverse” being considered. 
We believe that when certain property rights arrangements “persist”, one needs to be cautious 
in considering institutional interventions, as that persistence points to a spontaneously ordered 
institutional fabric engendered through actors’ multitudinous interactions (Ho, 2013). What is 
first and foremost needed is a comprehensive assessment of the temporally and spatially 
determined effects of property rights. These can be analyzed and measured through actors’ 
and economic agents’ aggregate perceptions of institutions’ credibility. According to the level 
of credibility that a certain property rights arrangement enjoys amongst a community of users, 
one might be in a better position to assess what kind of institutional intervention (on a scale 
from non-interventionist to interventionist) is likely successful: i) Condoning; ii) Co-opting; 
iii) Facilitating iv) Prohibiting; v) Ordaining (see Table 1 below). 
 
Table 1: Scales of Credibility and Intervention 
 
[Insert Table 1 about here] 
 
Source: (Ho, 2017) 
 
It is posited that when the credibility of existing institutional arrangements is found to be high 
or rising (i.e. from medium high to high), condoning or co-opting could be the better option. 
Facilitating approaches that pro-actively identify, nurture and support bottom-up innovation 
can be suitable when the majority of institutions features little change. Conversely, only when 
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credibility is low or decreasing might there be a fair chance for success for interventionist 
measures that actively aim to change institutions (such as by prohibition or command). When 
applying this to our case, a high or medium-high credibility of informal housing would either 
involve the acceptance of daily praxis (as the Chinese say: “open one eye, and close the other” 
(zheng yizhi yan, bi yizhi yan), or the cooptation thereof. 5  Would the institutional 
arrangements of informal housing be perceived as neutral, one could on the one hand, 
consider stimulating privatization and titling, while encouraging upgrading inferior-quality 
housing through, for instance, subsidies or tax-breaks for home-owners, home-owners’ 
associations, property management companies and developers. Contrarily, would social 
actors’ perceive credibility to be medium-low and low (or tending towards it), one could 
resort to more interventionist measures such as bans, conversion to formal social housing, sale 
of informal housing (i.e. formalization as marketable, affordable housing), or even the 
demolition of inferior-quality constructions. 
Having said this, the above depicted “Scales of Credibility and Intervention”  are not to be 
seen or applied as policy prescriptions or institutional blue-prints, but all the more as a 
safeguard against precipitous intervention. In different wording, the choice for non-
intervention should always be as seriously considered as intervention. Furthermore, credibility 
and institutional interventions are conceptualized as posited on a relative, contextualized 
continuum (Ho, 2014: 16) in contrast to a set of absolute, positivist indicators. Paradoxically, 
societal reality often features the launch of strict prohibitions and ordinances in a 
demonstration of political will and ambition, subsequently leading to the establishment of 
“empty” institutions decoupled from praxis and actors’ realities (e.g. Aubert, 1966; Aalders, 
1984; Ho, 2005, p.73). 
Titling and privatization of land and housing run that risk, as they are more often than not 
pushed for political reasons. What is disregarded is that  private, formal and secure 
institutional arrangements generally function for the transfer of property as economic assets. 
Yet, that might not be the function of institutions that exist and persist. By contrast, common, 
informal and allegedly “insecure” property rights often do not cater for economic transaction, 
but for an institutional function that is altogether different: namely social welfare (Ho, 2014; 
Davy and Pellisery, 2014; Guhan, 1994; Charlesworth, 1983). In this paper, we argue that 
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 This would be similarly the case for an institutional credibility that over time or space increases from medium-
high to high, or from neutral to medium-high. Hence, the word “trend” in the sub-heading of the table’s first 
column.
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China’s informal, extra-legal housing fulfills that very same function, and as such, does not 
benefit from formalization and titling (at least, not in the current stage of development). 
 
3. An Overview of Small Property Rights Housing in China 
 
3.1 Early development and typology 
Arguably, the earliest occurrence of (commercially sold) SPRH in China is said to have 
occurred in Guangdong province (Huang, 2011). After the start of the economic reforms in 
the late 1970s, a significant influx of FDI (Foreign Direct Investment) led to the establishment 
of numerous factories and enterprises in the coastal cities of Guangdong Province such as 
Shenzhen, Shantou and Zhuhai. Large numbers of migrant workers started to move to 
Guangdong in search of job opportunities, and at the same time en masse looked for housing 
in the receiving cities. In this context, informal housing built on cheaper, rural collectively 
owned land catered for the swelling demand. 
Based on the different types of rural collective land, three forms of SPRH sprouted in 
Guangdong which are: i) housing on farmers’ residential plots (zhaijidi); ii) on land for 
township enterprises, township/town/village facilities and public infrastructure (jianshe 
yongdi); and iii) on arable land (nongyongdi), also referred to as “contract land” (chengbaodi), 
which is leased to individual farmers. Farmers’ residential plots are regarded as one of the 
most important land use types in China (Wang et al., 2008). Villagers living on the urban 
fringe often demolish their own homes to build small apartment buildings, and then proceed 
to sell the property to migrant workers. This transaction is illegal as residential plots are 
distributed to villagers at no cost for their own housing construction use, and is not allowed to 
be sold to others. The second form of extra-legal housing is built on rural collective 
construction land, such as land for township enterprises, township/town and village facilities 
and public infrastructure, which is generally self-organized by the rural collective. That is to 
say, large scale housing complexes consisting of many housing units are built and then sold to 
migrant workers. In addition to these two forms, SPRH housing is also built on arable land. 
The law expressly prohibits the construction of any housing on arable land, while stipulating a 
minimum norm of 120 million hectares of arable land that needs to be strictly reserved to 
ensure food security (Liu, 2014, p.9).  
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Nowadays, the three forms of extra-legal housing are widespread across China in both large 
cities and small towns, with the latter form (built on arable land) being estimated to be 
smallest. Shenzhen is the city with the highest ratio of extra-legal housing, while its main 
form is built on farmers’ residential plots (Gao, 2012). In Beijing, the main form consists of 
large, extra-legal complexes constructed by rural collectives. 6 It was estimated that in 2006, 
the amount of SPRH in Beijing was 10 million m², accounting for 18% of its total housing 
and accommodating 0.3 million households (Yang, 2013,p.37). Additionally, such housing is 
also commonly found in other major cities like Tianjin, Chengdu, Nanjing, Xi’an, and 
Zhengzhou (Yuan, 2013). 
 
[Insert Figure 1: about here] 
Source: illustrated by authors 
 
Figure 1 illustrates the procedures of the development of formal versus extra-legal housing. 
The rural and urban land markets in China are strictly separated, while each features a 
complex two-tier institutional structure that governs economic transactions.7 According to 
Article 43 of the 2004 Land Administration Law, only state-owned land can be used for 
commercial real estate development. Therefore, rural collectively owned land should first be 
expropriated from the village collective by the county/city (or higher level government) 
against the payment of compensation to farmers for loss of assets and income. Subsequently, 
its ownership can be altered from (rural) collective to (urban) state-owned land. Following 
this, a real estate developer needs to apply to the government for commercial land use rights 
against the payment of a land conveyance fee (churangjin) at the so-called primary land 
market (yiji shichang). As shown in Table 2, revenues from land conveyance form a key 
source of income for the local government. In 2010, the land conveyance fees accounted for 
as much as 68 percent of total local fiscal revenues (Liu and Wang, 2014). Following the 
approval of the land use application, the county or city government, issues a certificate for the 
commercial land use of state-owned land (in effect: a land lease permit) to the developer. The 
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 A typical example are the large-scale complexes in Zhenggezhuang, Beijing (Liu, 2008). 
7
 A detailed description of the institutional structure and workings of the Chinese rural and urban markets is 
provided in (Ho, 2013). 
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developer can then start constructing the property, and after completion, sells the various 
housing units and its underlying individual land lease rights to buyers on the “secondary land 
market” (erji shichang). 
 
[Insert Table 2 about here] 
Source:  Liu and Wang (2014, p. 65) 
 
In contrast, the construction of SPRH circumvents this entire procedure as it is directly built 
by rural collectives-turned-developer, externally hired real estate companies, or individual 
peasants. As a result, significant costs for expropriation and land conveyance can be avoided, 
which explains the significant economic incentives that drive the supply and demand of SPRH. 
The costs for the development of extra-legal housing can be as low as one-third of the 
equivalent of formal housing (Cheng, 2012, p.34). This is a decisive factor for the rent-
seeking around the supply and development of SPRH. Similar rent-seeking also occurs at the 
demand-side, and propels the booming market in SPRH, with prices that may range as low as 
between 40%-60% of the price of formal housing in the same neighborhood (ibid., p.9).  The 
downside, of course, is that extra-legal housing lacks the necessary permits: i) the formal 
home ownership permit issued by the local government (and not the collective, i.e. village or 
township), and ii) the individual land lease permit also issued by the local government. 
 
3.2 Explaining the prevalence of extra-legal housing 
There are three main factors underlying the prevalence of SPRH. First, the increasing demand 
for housing in cities due to the ongoing urbanization. In 1978 only 18% of the total population 
lived in urban China. In 2013 this figure reached 54%, or about 731 million out of its 1.36 
billion citizens. Of these 731 million residents in urban China, 245 million were migrant 
workers (National Bureau of Statistics, 2014). Due to the large number of people migrating to 
the cities, the demand for urban housing has risen tremendously (Liu, 2014). Second, the 
affordability of informal housing relative to formal commercial housing. Migrant workers and 
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low income urban citizens (e.g. elderly, sick/disabled urban residents, college graduates and 
young professionals) generally cannot afford to purchase formal housing in cities due to its 
high prices. For example, in Beijing the housing price has risen five-fold over the past decade 
(Liu, 2014). In this context, more and more people are interested in purchasing informal 
housing since the price range is more affordable to them. Third, the lack of social housing. 
Although China boasted a huge stock of urban, public housing during the Maoist era, its 
subsequent privatization during the 1998 Housing Reforms left a lasting gap in the provision 
of social and affordable housing ever since. Therefore, instead of relying on the government, 
migrant workers and the urban poor have to solve housing issues on their own. Purchasing 
SPRH is one of the only options available to them. It is worth noting that in China’s 12th 
Five-Year Plan, the central government announced that 36 million units of social housing are 
to be built between 2011 and 2015 (State Council, 2011). However, this number of social 
housing is still inadequate to meet the large demand of the urban poor, while migrant workers 
may not be eligible to apply for these because of their rural residential status (hukou).8 
In the following section, the research methods and survey sample are described, followed by 
the presentation of the empirical data and analysis of the institutional credibility of SPRH 
along three dimensions: economic, social and psychological. 
 
4. Methodology and empirical results 
 
4.1. The survey 
 
To reflect urban and regional variation, we selected seven different large, middle and small-
sized cities as fieldwork sites. These are: Beijing, Tianjin, Guangzhou, Chongqing, Xi’an, 
Nanchang (Jiangxi) and Qingyang (Gansu province). Data collection was conducted in these 
sites from November 2013 until February 2014. Apart from population size, various 
motivations guided the selection of these cities as shown in Table 2. First, the cities are spread 
over different macro-regions, thus representing the major geographical differences of the 
Chinese nation. Guangzhou and Nanchang are located in southeastern China, Chongqing in 
the southwest, Beijing and Tianjin in the northeast, and Xi’an and Qingyuan in the northwest. 
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 As a result, rural migrant workers are generally also excluded from other facilities in the Chinese cities, such as 
education and health care. However, in recent years the hukou or household registration system has been 
gradually relaxed depending on the region. 
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Second, the selected sites present different levels of economic development. Based on 
municipal GDP per capita in 2013, Guangzhou is the highest at 120,105 yuan, followed 
respectively by Tianjin (101,689 yuan), Beijing (94,237 yuan), Nanchang (65,009 yuan), 
Xi’an (57,105 yuan), Chongqing (42,615 yuan), and Qingyang (27,790 yuan).9 Three, seen 
from a provincial level, Beijing, Tianjin, and Guangdong can be classified as receiving areas 
of migrant workers, while, Shaanxi, Gansu,  Jiangxi and Chongqing are sending areas. In the 
year 2014 it was estimated there were 274 million rural residents migrating to more 
prosperous cities for employment (National Bureau of Statistics, 2015). Purchasing SPRH is 
regarded as an optimal option if they decide to settle down in the receiving cities. 
 
[Insert Table 3 about here] 
Source: Authors’ fieldwork and (Shan, 2014a, b; National Bureau of Statistics, 2011)  
 
Triangulation is applied during data collection, that is, the analysis of information collected 
through a variety of methods (Patton, 1990:187). This research combines four methods: 
documentary analysis, in-depth interviews, participant observation, and a quantitative survey 
(i.e. questionnaire). First, the documentary analysis of law, policies, and regulations at 
different administrative levels is the main source used to explore the government’s measures 
and political views on extra-legal housing historically and currently. Second, a total of 13 in-
depth interviews with various stakeholders represent an overview and detailed source for 
understanding the process of informal property development. Three in-depth interviews were 
conducted with the constructers, three with the sellers, five with the buyers and two with local 
officials. The interviews were anonymized and conducted in Guangzhou and Chongqing. 
Third, participant observation was done to offer a closer perspective on the people involved in 
extra-legal housing. During the fieldwork, one of the authors participated as a potential buyer 
interested in purchasing SPRH in Beijing, Tianjin, Guangzhou and Chongqing. Through this 
method, intensive interaction was possible with the constructers, sellers, and buyers. 
Fourth, a quantitative survey through questionnaires was conducted on the basis of data 
collected from the former three methods. The survey was used to test the main, alternative 
hypothesis (H1), i.e. the institutional arrangements of SPRH are perceived as credible by its 
buyers (despite the lack of formal property rights). The null hypothesis (H0) was formulated 
as: the institutional arrangements of SPRH are not perceived as credible. The survey sample 
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 This includes state council-level administered municipalities, such as Beijing, Chongqing and Tianjin. One 
Chinese yuan (or RMB) was approximately 0.16 US Dollar during the fieldwork period. 
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consist of 300 opportunistically selected buyers and home-owners of SPRH (each 
representing 1 household),10 with 50 in Beijing, Tianjin, Guangzhou, Chongqing and Xi’an, 
30 in Qingyang and 20 in Nanchang. Although the data from the survey sample cannot be 
generalized for the total population, it may have a certain degree of representativeness with 
n=291.11 Among them, 62% were male respondents and 38% female respondents; 76% of 
respondents were between 21 and 49 years old, 22% above 50 years older and 1% below 20 
years old. Regarding the educational background, 6% of the respondents attended primary 
school or were illiterate, 55% received a high school degree, 38 % obtained college or a 
university degree, and even 1% got a degree from the graduate school. As for occupation, the 
majority of the respondents (75%) were employed in urban informal sectors, 16% in urban 
formal sectors, and 9% were engaged in farming (see Appendix). 
 
4.2 Measuring Credibility 
 
4.2.1. Economic credibility: housing price and home improvement 
 
For one, SPRH buyers’ perceptions on housing price and investments reflect its credibility 
from an economic angle. It was found that 70% of respondents stated affordability as the main 
reason for purchasing extra-legal housing. As one respondent described: 
 
“I bought my apartment in 2009. The main reason for me to buy it is because it 
was cheap, 5,000 yuan/m². At the time, the formal housing price in the same area 
was already 12,000 yuan/m², which I could not afford. The difference between the 
two types of housing was 7,000 yuan/ m², and the size of my apartment is 70 m², 
which means I paid 490,000 yuan less by choosing this one.” (oral communication, 
27 /11/2013, buyer Qin XX, Beijing ) 
 
Across the nation, the price of extra-legal housing is significantly lower than that of formal 
commercial housing. As shown in Figure 2 (n=291), the calculated average housing price is 
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 The respondents were thus not randomly selected, but interviewed when people were willing to participate. 
This was generally done by starting a causal chat with SPRH dwellers in the public spaces of the community. 
After gaining their trust, they generally became the first interviewees. Through snowball sampling, these 
interviewees, in turn, facilitated in approaching additional respondents in the community. 
11
 As stated earlier in the paper, the estimated number of SPRH is 70 million units (Li, 2014). The required 
representative sample for a population of this size would amount to 385 at an error margin of 5% and a 
confidence level of 95%. 
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50% of the price of comparable formal housing in the vicinity. The price difference between 
SPRH and formal housing varies regionally. In Beijing the average price of all respondents’ 
housing was 4,410 yuan/m², compared to 7,604 yuan/m² of that of the formal commercial 
housing (i.e. 58% of the price for formal housing).12 Guangzhou exhibits the largest price 
difference, where the price of SPRH is just 30% of that of formal housing, while Qingyuan is 
67%, representing the smallest difference among the seven research sites. The figures for the 
other cities are respectively 39% in Nanchang, 48% in Tianjin, 60% in Chongqing, and 62% 
in Xi’an. 
 
[Insert Figure 2 about here] 
Source: This survey (n=289 ) 
 
Furthermore, SPRH is also economically credible from the angle of payments and 
investments. For starters, upon receipt of the ownership permit 97% of the respondents had 
already paid off the total housing price – either in installments or as a lump sum. As showed 
in Table 3, the average price of all respondents’ extra-legal housing is 245,265 yuan, while 
the amount spent on investment is 61,569 yuan on average, which equals 30% of the total 
housing price. The ratio between the housing price and investments varies from region to 
region. For example, in Guangdong, the money spent on investment (62,700 yuan) is almost 
equivalent to half of the total housing price (146,800 yuan), while in Beijing, the former is 
only around 13% of the latter. It is surprising to find that in some cases the amount of money 
spent on investment exceeds the total housing price. For example, one interviewee bought his 
housing in 1998, which was 1100 yuan/m². The size of his apartment is 90 m². Therefore, the 
total housing price he paid is 99,000 yuan. Subsequently, he had spent 100,000 yuan investing 
in his home (oral communication, 26 December 2013, buyer Mr. Xiang XX, Guangdong). 
 
[Insert Table 4 about here] 
Source: This survey (n=289) 
 
4.2.2. Social credibility: Perception of ownership and other socio-cultural factors 
 
                                                          
12
 At the time of the survey, 1 Chinese Yuan roughly equaled 0.16 US Dollar. 
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Markedly, 93% of respondents believe that the SPRH is owned by them and their family. 
Such a perception indicates a high degree of institutional credibility of SPRH’s extra-legal 
property rights. Certain scholars (Zhong, 2008) have suggested that people are being tricked 
into purchasing extra-legal housing due to their low legal awareness. We have found no 
indication of this during the in-depth interviews. By contrast, a large number of the 
interviewed buyers (62%) openly state that – prior to the purchase of the house – they were 
aware of the difference in ownership between SPRH and formal housing.  This percentage is 
all the more significant, as admitting to buying SPRH is tantamount to admitting that one has 
purchased property deemed illegal by the state. 
In addition to the affordability of SPRH, other reasons for purchase include socio-cultural 
factors such as getting married, employment, children’s education, and elderly care (see 
Figure 4 below). First, in answer to which (multiple) reasons they had to buy SPRH, 19% of 
respondents noted they purchased the property for getting married. It is an open secret in 
Chinese society that having housing is a customary prerequisite for men to ask women for 
marriage (Hu, 2013). As men outnumber women by 34 million in China (National Bureau of 
Statistics, 2011), having one/more housing(s) would increase men’s competitiveness when 
finding a women. One interviewee mentioned “I could not propose to my wife without this 
house” (oral communication, 21/12/2013, buyer, Jiangxi). 
 
[Insert Figure 4 about here] 
Source: This survey 
 
Second, 16 percent of the respondents stated that they bought extra-legal housing because it is 
an easier commute to work. Third, due to large differences in educational quality and facilities 
between the rural and urban areas, it is common to find rural parents purchase housing in 
urban China to allow their children better access to urban schools. 15% of respondents 
consider this as one of the reasons for them to purchase SPRH. A respondent stated: 
 
“The primary schools and high schools in this neighborhood have a good reputation which 
is much better than the one in our village. We bought this apartment mainly for my son’s 
schooling since he could walk to the school in 15 minutes” (oral communication, 5/1/2014, 
buyer Ms. Liu XX, Chongqing). 
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Fourth, against the background of better healthcare services in urban than in rural China  (Liu 
and Sun, 2015), 10% of respondents also replied that they bought extra-legal housing as it was 
more convenient for the elderly. 
 
4.2.3. Psychological credibility: herd behavior and little fear of eviction 
 
SPRH has also been found institutionally credible in a psychological sense as evident through 
herd behavior and the perception of the likelihood of eviction. Herd behavior, defined by 
Banerjee (1992, p.798) as “everyone doing what everyone else is doing”, has a significant 
impact on social actors’ attitude and behavior. 67% of respondents said they decided to buy 
after noticing that their peers had purchased or were considering to purchase SPRH. An 
interviewee: 
 
“You can find lots of people who have bought SPRH here. Three of my friends and one of 
my cousins bought such housing around 2000 and lived inside comfortably, which had no 
difference from formal housing and no risk at all. After consulting with them, I decided to 
purchase this housing in 2004” (oral communication, 29/12/2013, buyer Mr. Wang XX, 
Guangdong). 
 
The above might also lend credence to the argument by Prechter and Parker (2007) that 
herding can reduce perceived uncertainty. Due to the informality of extra-legal housing, 
buyers try to reduce their sense of uncertainty by observing and following the behavior of 
their peers. 
From a neo-classical perspective, fear of eviction is regarded as a serious obstacle to purchase 
informal property. Despite the fact that SPRH is not legally recognized, people are interested 
in purchasing and investing in it because they do not feel that eviction is likely to happen. 
Merely 2% of respondents state they would refrain from improving and furnishing the 
housing because the government may evict them. An interviewee expressed: 
 
“I am sure the government would not evict us. If it would happen, we would lose our homes. 
Where should we live then? [mockingly] Maybe we would just get together and sleep at 
Tian’anmen square, while guys would probably even resort to violence.” (oral 
communication, 21/11/2013, buyer Ms. Zhang XX, Beijing). 
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Zhang’s statement touches on a wider and increasingly shared sentiment amongst Chinese 
citizens and peasants that they are justified to organize demonstration or take violent action 
against the government if they are evicted (cf. Pils, this volume{}). Since maintaining social 
stability is regarded as a top priority by the Chinese government (Doyon and Laederich, 2012), 
it is not likely that large-scale, government-backed expropriation to enforce planning and 
building regulations will occur any time soon. 
 
4.3. Function in social welfare 
 
Over the past decade, the purchase of formal housing for reasons of investment and 
speculation has greatly increased (Guo and Huang, 2010). Contradictorily, the overall 
majority of SPRH was bought to fulfill the function of a primary home. Our survey found that 
95% of the respondents indicated the SPRH was purchased to have housing for them and their 
family. Additionally, 3% of the respondents replied “for rent” while no respondent answered 
“for sale”.13 These figures confirm the findings of another survey of 240 respondents by 
(Chen and Guo, 2012: 33) who found that only 5.42% of the interviewees replied they bought 
SPRH “for investment”.14 
Moreover, the main social group purchasing and living in extra-legal housing belongs to the 
low(er) income groups. As Table 5 shows, the gross monthly income of the majority of 
respondents (varying from 71% to 100%) is below the local average income. For example, 
respondents’ income in Beijing, Chongqing and Qingyuan, is without exception lower than 
the average income in the respective cities. Moreover, a considerable percentage of 
respondents’ income is below the local minimum income. This varies from 33 percent in 
Guangzhou up to 92 percent in Qingyuan. 
 
[Insert Table 5 about here] 
 
Source: This survey (n=288) and  National Bureau of Statistics (2012) 
 
Another indication of the social status of those living in SPRH, is provided by the number of 
property they own. Prior to purchasing extra-legal housing, 45% of the respondents rented a 
                                                          
13
 The remaining 2% mentioned for “other reasons”. 
14
 The survey was carried out from November 2010 to January 2011 in the provinces of Jiangxi, Anhui, Hubei 
and Guangdong. 
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house in the cities, whereas another 33% lived in their original housing in the home village. In 
sum, the majority of the buyers did not have their own housing in the city. Echoing other in-
depth interviews conducted during the fieldwork, a certain Ms. Liu shared her story: 
 
“I came to Guangzhou as a migrant worker in 1999. After renting places to live for 10 
years, my husband and I bought this house in 2009. I feel delighted to have our own place” 
(oral communication, 29 December 2013, buyer, Guangzhou). 
 
In the cities, a large group of migrant workers such as Ms. Liu have been longing to have a 
“home” of their own to experience a proper family life. The significance of extra-legal 
housing is not to be underestimated: 58% stated that SPRH is the only property they have, 
while another 30% maintained that they also own one rural property in the countryside. In 
different words, for 88% of respondents, SPRH is the only house they have in the city (Figure 
3). 
 
[Insert Figure 3 about here] 
Source: This survey (n=291) 
 
From the above, it can be derived that SPRH provides an affordable, good-quality option for 
rural-urban migrants and low(er) income groups. Of those who have bought extra-legal 
housing, the overall majority (93%) felt it was worth the money, with merely 1% feeling it 
was not worth the value. As a large proportion has been professionally developed and built by 
real estate companies, SPRH provides a decent form of housing in terms of quality, location, 
and basic infrastructure; unlike other forms of informal settlements, such as slums, squatters 
and migrant dormitories. This fact is also reflected in the survey: only 7% of respondents 
found the quality of extra-legal housing bad. 
 
5. Conclusion: Extra-legality, a credible alternative? 
 
Small Property Rights’ Housing in China is particularly sensitive due to its evident violation 
of national laws and regulations, in combination to its sheer magnitude – an estimated one-
third of the total urban housing stock. The central authorities are heavily divided over the 
issue: some advocate its formalization through titling, others favor clampdown to uphold the 
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state’s legitimacy and credibility. Symbolic for the divided stance is the outcome of the 18th 
Party Congress in 2013, when the Chinese Communist Party heralded the commercialization 
of rural collective construction land with “similar rights and similar prices” (tongquan 
tongjia, CCP Central Committee, 2013, Section 11). Merely one and a half week later, the 
Ministry of Land and Resources and Ministry of Housing and Urban-Rural Development  
(2013, Section 1) jointly rushed to issue an urgent notice which clearly ruled to “rigorously 
curb the construction and sale of Small Property Rights’ Housing.” 
There are several reasons why both strict suppression, as well as formalization might need 
rethinking. For one, suppression will put a serious drain on state resources for enforcement – 
be it financial, material and personnel resources. It also raises the immediate question what to 
do with the inhabitants of SPRH. The reality of the millions who bought and live in informal 
housing a priori rules out a clampdown as it would merely solve a problem by creating an 
even bigger one. Moreover, an important question relating to formalization regards its legal 
effect: does private title imply that the owner is allowed to sell? If so, is that allowed with or 
without payment of the land conveyance fee, and other associated costs for altering rural 
collective land into urban state land? Refraining from such requirement might be tantamount 
to opening the gate for even greater rent-seeking over land originally set aside for exclusive 
use within the rural collective. If ownership is contingent upon payment of the land 
conveyance fee, one may wonder who can bear these costs, which leads to the issue of who 
buys and lives in SPRH. 
This article has argued that the problem’s solution might lie in shifting away attention from 
institutional form to function. In other words, what does SPRH do and mean for its owners 
and users on the ground? When looking into this question it becomes obvious that China’s 
SPRH fulfills a critical function for its owners – not as a marketable asset, but as a form of 
social security. For one, as its average price is only half that of formal, commercial housing, it 
might not come as a surprise that over two-thirds of the respondents indicated it was one of 
their motivations for buying. In addition, those who buy generally belong to the lower income 
groups. In all research sites, the majority of the respondents (varying from 71 to 100%) fell 
below the average income level, and in many causes also below minimum income. 
Owners did not only buy because of its low price, but also as they regarded it as good value 
for money. In addition, multiple socially motivated reasons are mentioned for the purchase, 
including for marriage (19%), work (16%), children’s education (15%), and healthcare for the 
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elderly (10%).15 Interesting is the finding that despite the lack of relevant government-issued 
land use and home ownership permits, SPRH owners make significant investments for home 
improvement that on average add up to 30% of the price against which the property was 
bought. SPRH owners feel confident about their property rights with 93% of the respondents 
stating they have full ownership. At the same time, a majority of the respondents (63%) is 
well aware of the difference in property rights between formal housing and SPRH, while only 
2 per cent would be deterred from home improvements because of the prospect of 
expropriation. 
From the above, it is not difficult to see that SPRH is perceived as credible by its buyers 
regardless whether that is assessed in economic, social or psychological terms. The lower 
income groups – not in the least the millions of peasants who have left their home villages for 
employment in the cities – are the social groups that are unable to afford formal property after 
the price hikes in urban real estate of the past decades. They also fail to entitle for official 
social housing – even more difficult to obtain for non-local hukou holders – as local social 
housing projects continue to lag behind national targets and aims. Against this backdrop, 
SPRH appears to pose an affordable, good-quality and all in all, credible alternative at the 
present stage of China’s development.16 It is a conclusion that resonates with research in a 
wider developing context (e.g. Davy and Pellissery, 2013; Chand and Yala, 2012, p.152). In 
fact, it also resonates with research from the past, as Mangin (1967, p. 85) aptly noted on 
Latin American informal settlements: “The squatter settlements represent a solution to the 
complex problem of rapid urbanization and migration, combined with a housing shortage.” 
This being the case, rather than having the discussion whether SPRH should be outlawed or 
formalized, maintaining its current extra-legal status, i.e. officially prohibited, yet, 
unofficially condoned, might for now perhaps be the preferred option. 
Does that imply that privatization and titling are by definition a bad idea in dealing with 
informal housing? Definitely not. Yet, it is vital to consider the conditions under which 
certain institutional interventions are attempted. That consideration critically hinges on a solid 
understanding of existing institutional function, measurable through the levels of perceived 
credibility (see also Table 1 above). Put differently, actors’ aggregate perceptions of the 
function of an existing institutional arrangement determine what kind of policy measures are 
                                                          
15
 Answer categories belonging to the same question with regard to the price. Quality and value for money were 
measured separately. 
16
 The function of informal housing in the provision of social welfare has been underscored by various other 
Chinese researches (Huang and Tao, 2014; He et al., 2010; Wang et al., 2009; Lin, 2009). 
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likely to succeed or fail. In this regard, it must not be forgotten that private, titled institutions 
by and large function for the economic transfer of commodities, and much less so for the 
provision of social welfare and security (cf. Ho, 2014; Davy and Pellisery, 2014; Guhan, 1994; 
Charlesworth, 1983). Most owners and buyers of SPRH do not aim to sell their property, 
because it is seen as their primary abode and first entry to the Chinese city and its facilities, 
not as an asset for investment. 
At a later stage in development, for instance, when the demand for affordable housing tapers 
off, or when formal social housing has been developed at a larger and sufficient scale, a 
differential treatment of China’s extra-legal housing could be considered. Ergo, institutional 
changes catering for new housing functions could then perhaps be pursued: 
i) For rural-urban migrants’ and low(er) income social groups’ who continue to live in 
SPRH; conversion into (state-supported) social rental housing. 
ii) For those with the economic means and wish to sell; voluntary titling as affordable, 
yet, marketable housing on the condition of (whole or partial) payment of the land 
conveyance fee. 
iii) For those living in inferior-quality housing, while sufficient alternative social housing 
is available; demolition and cracking down on cases  of severe violations of building 
quality and spatial planning (see also Jiang, 2014). 
 
However, whatever option is considered, government interventions that aim to change 
existing property rights arrangements are better guided by a thorough understanding of the 
meaning and function that actors accord to it. 
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